On the backdrop of the 2008 financial crisis this paper introduces an understanding of societal crises as a reduction in the meaning production of social entities, which can either be internally or externally provoked. The emergence of constitutions and, more generally, constitutional structures, can be understood as responses to both forms of crisis. This is the case because they are double-edged structures which are simultaneously oriented towards the maintenance of internal order and stability within a given social entity at the same time as they frame the transfer of the meaning components between the social entities and their environments. Thus, the 2008 financial crisis indicates a failure of constitutional bonding. When observed from an overall structural perspective, the reasons for this failure can be traced back to an increased discrepancy between the structural composition of world society and the constitutional structures in place. The crisis reflects a failure to respond to two simultaneous, inter-related and mutually re-inforcing structural transformations. First, there is the increased globalisation, which has led to massive dis-locations in the relative centrality of the different national configurations for the reproductive processes of functional systems. Second, there is a structural transformation of the transnational layer of world society through a reduced reliance on the centre/periphery differentiation and an increased reliance on functional differentiation.
Thus, the 2008 financial crisis can be understood as a symptom which indicates a failure of constitutional bonding. When observed from an overall structural perspective, the reasons for this failure can be traced back to an increased discrepancy between the structural composition of world society and the constitutional structures in place. The crisis reflects a failure to respond to two simultaneous, inter-related and mutually re-inforcing structural transformations. First, there is the increased globalisation of functional systems, which has led to massive dis-locations in the relative centrality of the different national configurations for the reproductive processes of functional systems. Second, there is a structural transformation of the transnational layer of world society through a reduced reliance on the centre/periphery differentiation and an increased reliance on functional differentiation. One of the many consequences of this development is the emergence of new forms of transnational law and politics. A new constitutional architecture which 1 1 Stress related mental breakdowns might reflect a similar form of discrepancy induced crisis in relation to psychic systems. It might also be possible to understand internal crises, or at least the frequency of such crises, as a reflection of the increased acceleration (Beschleunigung) of the reproduction of societal structures. But a crisis might also be a result of a more profound structural process due to a weakening of a particular close coupling between systems due to increased differentiation (Ausdifferenzierung). For example, the continued crisis of the German university system might be traced back to an inability to adapt to the increased weakening of the institutionalised linking of the systems of science and education within the framework of the Humboldtian model. Scientific discoveries can, moreover, undermine established scientific facts, thereby potentially provoking a crisis in relation to an established scientific paradigm. As we will return to in more detail later on, a different form of internal reconfiguration crisis stems from the increased globalisation of one or more systems.
For example, the breakdown of Europe as a specific legal and political space (Raum) Another example can be found in the relative weakening of the position of the religious system in society due to the emergence of a whole range of functional systems in early modernity. Indeed, this led to an internal crisis for the Catholic Church due to an increased undermining of the world view upon which its coherency relied and an internal re-configuration of the religious system through the reformation. in the first half of the Twentieth century certainly led to a crisis of catastrophic dimensions. When viewed from a long-term perspective, this development was, however, intrinsically linked to an increased globalisation of the kind of statehood which characterised Europe at the time, due to the gradual inclusion of, first, the United States and Japan, and, eventually, the entire globe in The consequence of the implosion of scientific paradigms however tend to be the emergence of an increased number of competing sub-discourses within a specific academic field. This, again, might have an increase in the scope of meaning production as a long-term consequence. time at which the meaning components in question were dispatched. The receiving system is always one step ahead. In addition, external influences only have an effect when they are internally conceived and processed within the receiving system. The sovereignty of interpretation (Deutungshoheit) always remains the prerogative of the receiving system. Except for cases in which a system is being entirely eradicated in Another reason for variations in the form of crisis is that the relative weight between (self-) reflection (Reflexion), performance (Leistung) vis-à-vis other social systems and societal function (Funktion) towards society as whole, differs from system to system. The consequence is that different systems produce different forms of effects vis-à-vis their social environments, and thus create different forms of crises.
For example, within the systems of art, intimacy and certain strands of religion and science (Wissenschaft) reflection plays a relatively bigger role than within other functional systems due to the porous and very "fluid" media of communication upon which these systems rely. The consequence is that the forms of communication of which these systems consist tend to emerge as irritations within the most unexpected settings in their social environments. This again creates a tendency within these systems to elevate momentary, but creative, forms of de-differentiation into a systemic imperative (Systemziel), in the sense that art systematically seeks to break boundaries just as true love is supposed to defy all restrictions. As expressed in the strong reliance on a semantic of subjectivity, crisis experiences, moreover, tend to be framed in a personalised "existentialist" manner within these systems. But if the kinds of de-differentiation that these systems produce succeed in sustaining themselves over a considerable period of time, a semantic backlash which emphasises the danger of a decadent "Late Roman" downfall of society in its entirety tends to emerge, with the implication that hidden forces are mobilised against the Rasputins of this world.
The political system is, on the other hand, characterised by a relatively stronger emphasis on the function which it produces vis-à-vis society in its entirety.
When the political system operates in the state form, the strong emphasis on societal function is expressed through its orientation towards the (re-) construction of territory and the production of collectively-binding decisions. The relatively stronger focus on societal function does not, however, provide the political system with any sort of superiority. This is, first of all, the case because no hierarchy exists between function, performance and reflection. The integration of society remains conditioned by the simultaneous existence of all three forms. The three dimensions are not related to each other in the style of Russian dolls, where each one is contained in the following one. Second, although the tasks which the political systems reproduces are of a very fundamental nature, the relatively higher focus on the reproduction of functions vis-à-vis society as whole is reflected in an equally strong reduction of the range of tasks which the political system in the form of the state deals with.
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The extreme denseness, but the equally reduced form, of meaning production within the political system is also reflected in the forms of crises which the political system produces. In most cases, a political crisis, such as a crisis of succession, which threatens to break the autopoietic chain from operation to operation, only affects a small circle of players who operate within the kind of policy networks which tend to surround the peaks of political organisations.
The political system might produce more compact components than systems with a stronger emphasis on reflection, but, as we will return to soon, the price paid is that the reach of political language remains limited, a limitation that subsequently tends to be "covered-up" through the kind of ideological semantics which, on paper, remain oriented towards society in its entirety. 9 Even when a coup d'état is orchestrated, life on the streets tends to return to normality within days. But as the totalitarian form of the political, in the form of Fascism, National Socialism, The presumption that a link exists between the general restraint of the political system and such tsunamis is also supported by the fact that totalitarian politics tends to emerge within settings with relatively weak states, whereas strong 9 Another example is the EU where the autopoietic chain goes from treaty revision to treaty revision and where crises semantics emerges every time a revision process is delayed or threatens to fail. See, also, P,F. deeper impact on the concrete set up and the operational mode of other systems.
Thus, the legal system is interfering in far more settings and different problem constellations than the political system, but it tends to do this in a less generalised manner, thereby providing a basis for the common misapprehension that the legal system is a mere "implementing tool" of the political system.
The economic system also has a strong focus on performance. Intimacy and certain forms of religion are probably the exceptions which confirm the rule that functional systems cannot operate without relying on a continued flow of economic resources, and thus very tight couplings to the economic system. Whereas the legal system, in most cases, merely provides an overall framing, and, as such, tends to remain a "back-up" system which is only activated in cases of profound conflicts, the money medium, in contrast, enjoys a far more widespread use in the everyday operations of social systems. On the one hand, economic resources provide abilities, while, on the other, the continued need for financing tends to introduce a structural incitement of accommodation to economic rationality, as, for example, expressed in tendencies towards commercialisation within areas such as science, health, art and the mass media. Such accommodations mainly occur in contexts in which budget requirements have to be met. Thus, they mainly unfold within the framework of organisations such as universities, film studios, hospitals, art museums, newspapers and so on. This means that the effect on other functional systems is mainly indirect, in the sense that moves towards accommodation are rarely directly oriented towards the logic which guides functional systems, but are, instead, oriented against the organisational infrastructure upon which they rely. For example, New Public Management tools which are deployed in order to optimise organisations economically only indirectly influence the functional systems which are dependent on these organisations. Hence, the accommodation to economic rationality does not make the specific functional rationalities disappear, but they do indirectly reduce the field of possible operations to be selected because they tend to frame the organisational structures upon which these systems rely.
The strong focus on performance within the economic system and the widespread use of the money medium means that an economic crisis is likely to have more frequent and more rapid epidemic effects than crises within most other functional systems. Suddenly, budgets have to be cut and projects postponed, and typically this occurs in a relatively indiscriminate manner. Thus, the immediate form of a crisis, namely, a discrepancy between expectations and actual developments, is likely to be induced more frequently by the economic system than by most other systems. This, again, might explain why the economic system is often understood as being more prone to crises than other functional systems. But, although an economic crisis (for example, the Great Depression) is clearly capable of triggering massive societal transformations, this is rarely the case. A crisis within the economic system in its modern form seldom leads to a complete collapse in the integrity of other social systems, but merely introduces a temporary narrowing of possibilities. Thus, economic crises might be more frequent, but they also tend to have relatively superficial effects on the structural composition of the other parts of society.
III. The Limited Reach of Classical Political Language
The temptation to bend objectives in order to accommodate the need for finance and the conception that the economic systems introduce frequent limitations on the scope of meaning production within other systems have traditionally produced a certain discomfort vis-à-vis the money medium and the logic which guides economic reproduction. One expression of this is the continued endeavour of political forces to "re-embed" the economic system. Political ideologies such as Conservatism, Socialism, Ecology, Nationalism and Islamism all share this aspiration. In their totalitarian versions, this is expressed in attempts to re-establish a holistic world through radical de-differentiation. In the softer and non-totalitarian versions, the aspiration is expressed in well intentioned attempts to maintain "cosiness and ...
rurality" (Nestwärme und … Ländlichkeit).
16 Such substantialist ideologies are, however, semantic fictions, in the sense that they are constructions which reflect the "second nature" (zweite Natur) of modernity. 17 Hence, although such fictions tend to have real effects, they have never been capable of re-establishing the perceived blessings of the pre-modern world. 18 However, irrespectively of the ideology chosen, a conceptualisation which relies on classical political language fails to capture important dimensions. From the internal perspective of the political system, the question of the relation between the economic system and its environment is essentially reduced to the question of more or less statehood. But calls for "more state" ignores, as already indicated, the fact that blind evolutionary turns with real catastrophic effects tend to happen more often within the political, than within the economic, system. Moreover, political forces calling for a re-embedment of the processes of economic reproduction by the state fail to acknowledge that the state, too, is a dis-embedded structure. The modern state is, in contrast to pre-modern forms of rule, a distinct and abstract legal person, which is separate from its members. The modern sovereign state is a structure of generalised and impersonal rule, in the sense that all rules apply to all persons within a given territory. It is a form of rule which only requires a minimum of communication towards its subjects, and only in a form which refers to specific roles which unfold In more general terms, emancipative social theory tends to ignore the fact that modern society is, above all, an "organisational society"
(Organisationsgesellschaft). 28 The importance of the organisational dimension is academic settings. Senior academics advocate emancipation in their academic work at the same time as they, with different degrees of eagerness, are forced to rely on the classical disciplinary instruments of bureaucratic power when operating as science managers. Activation of the legal system is, moreover, not necessarily an answer to such problems. Formalised law merely tends to introduce even more inflexible and de facto hierarchical structures, in the sense that a strict legal framing tends to underpin, rather than to undermine, Weberian forms of organisation.
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Étatist and non-étatist legal and political theory alike are frozen in a classical modernist ideological form which does not correspond to the actual form of social operations. Instead, management and organisation theory, together with pedagogical theory, are the most promising academic discourses when it comes to the question of producing meaning components which are capable of increasing the dynamics of emancipative social transformation in contemporary society. If one wanted to re-ignite a radically emancipative project today, seeking employment in a business school, in a school of public administration or in a pedagogical college would probably be more meaningful than entering the ranks of a legal or a social science faculty or partaking in a cross-over think tank.
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IV. The Constitutional Order of National Configurational Webs
The limited reach of political language has direct implications for the understanding of how social order is produced in modern society, in so far as the conventional understanding of the role of the political system in society is intrinsically linked to the idea that the establishment of social order is the prerogative of the political system.
The political system in the form of states certainly plays a central role, but this has
34
For example, the difficulties of reforming public universities in Continental Europe seems to be closely linked to the difficulties of breaking the tight legal regulations provided by labour law in general, and the regulation of public sector employees in particular. 35 For example, http://www.solidarische-moderne.de.
always been merely one of several dimensions. The phenomenon which, in mainstream language, is denoted as nation states should, instead, be understood as far more complex configuration, consisting of a whole range of functional subsystems, regimes, organisations, networks, professions and more or less intangible cultural components, all of which relate to each order in a multitude of ways. Such configurations are characterised by a dense web of mutually re-inforcing structural couplings within a limited section of world society, which establish a convergence of expectations between multiplicities of observers. As such, they produce a kind of localised "higher order", which cannot be reduced to the sum of its components. But this does not mean that such configurations merely represent the sum of the legal and the political systems, or that they can be understood as structures in which other societal structures are succumbed to the primacy of the political-legal complex.
The limited reach of political and legal framings can be illustrated by the fact that the different dimensions of such configurations rely on different degrees of territorial boundedness. For example, whereas clearly defined territoriality is very outspoken in relation to legal and political sub-systems, the term "national economies" remains a far more porous and metaphorical concept, notwithstanding the fact that a higher density of economic exchange can be observed within configurational orders. But the different dimensions do not just operate with different degrees of territorial boundedness. Prior to the introduction of the Euro, Belgium and Luxembourg were a common monetary area; the humanities (Geisteswissenschaft) and parts of the social science which rely on the German language, are probably better understood upon the basis of linguistic, rather than territorial, delineations, thereby adding Austria and the German-speaking parts of Switzerland to the core of German speaking academia, just as one observes that Canadian baseball clubs play in the US league, rather than in a separate Canadian league and so forth. Such examples, first of all, illustrate that territorial delineations remain internal boundaries and are not politicallyor legally-established frames. Moreover, that the existence of a configurational web is not conditioned by complete identical territorial delineations within its different dimensions, but merely by a certain degree of territorial overlap. The idea that the sovereign state possesses absolute power within its territory is, therefore, a semantic fiction which has never actually existed in reality. real effects in terms of which forms of communications are selected. 40 One central aspect of configurational webs is mutual stabilisation through the emergence of dense institutionalised links, in the form of, for example, (neo-) corporatist structures of the kind which emerged in the wake of the increased differentiation between the economic and the political system. Thus, configurational webs reduce the autonomy of the systems in question, at the same time as they tend to increase the ability of these systems to rely on the meaning components produced by other systems, thereby providing systems with additional "productive capacities".
Configurational webs represent highly improbable and complex evolutionary outcomes because they imply a mutual fixation of a whole range of systemic structures which allow for continued expansion at the same time as the internal volatility of system reproduction is reduced through the capture of the web.
Successful configurations can thus be seen as evolutionary responses to the looming threat of crises, in the sense that they produce order, understood as social stability, through the reduction of the internal volatility within its different components at the same time as externally-induced crowding-out effects and asymmetries are minimised.
They serve as frames for the production of societal trust within their respective societal spheres, and, as such, provide a contribution to the internal stability of such structures, in the sense that they tend to reduce volatility. Whereas functional systems, in their core, operate upon the basis of clear cut system boundaries and accordant internal density, system cultures are far more fluid and overlapping, and, as such, are far less dense, thereby establishing a high level of inter-systemic entanglement.
The reality of configurational webs is mainly established at the level of organisations and regimes, in the sense that, as already indicated, formal organisation is the backbone of modern society. Formal organisation is the form through which internal order is established within functionally-delineated areas just as The consequence is that a particular form of second order politics can be observed, in the sense that the internal form of ordering within functional spheres becomes a question which is channelled into organisational arrangements which produce collectively-binding decisions or the functional equivalents to collective decisions within their respective functional areas. Such forms of the political do not, however, imply a totalising state or a "complete" politicisation of society. This is, first of all, the case because such forms of the political remain a "secondary code" which merely operates as an attachment to the codes of the system in question. stabilisation which are specifically oriented towards enabling and limiting such forms of the political in the same operation, thereby reducing the chances that political communication is taken to the streets and subsequently turned into a witch-hunt by the mob. Thus, "societal" or non-state forms of the political remain limited to a specific form of organisational politics.
It follows from this that successful configurations neither operate upon the basis of a total subordination of society to political rationality, nor in a form in which the political only resides in the state in the narrow formalistic Luhmannian sense.
Instead, a certain gradualisation of the political can be observed, in the sense that some linkages between the state-based form of the political and secondary forms remains tighter than others, just as the internal degree of hierarchy within the secondary forms differs from one societal area to another. discrepancy, in the sense that they change over time, but generally at a slower pace than the societal structures against which they are oriented. They are societal anchors which frame societal developments, in the sense that they, at the same time, limit the number of potential operations which can be selected, and provide principles which aim to facilitate the selection of actual operations. As such, they can also be understood as forms of ordering, in the sense that they constitute the form of reproduction of the selfsame social structures against which they are oriented.
The framing of the social order is achieved through a double movement, in the which serve as forms which aim to curtail structural drifts towards coalescence, in the sense that they seek to counter asymmetric relations and the entanglement of functional cultures through the formalisation of authority, competences and decisional procedures just as they more generally consolidate the functionally-differentiated character of society through their underpinning of the organisational set-up upon which functional systems rely. 46 Constitutional bonding is the real Wunderwaffe with which internally and externally induced crises are confronted.
V. The Globalisation of National Configurational Webs through Crisis
The kind of configurational webs normally associated with nation states can also be understood as conglomerates of Eigenstructures (Eigenstrukturen).
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The emergence of such configurations in Europe took place within the framework of already existing feudal structures. The evolution of modern forms of organisation, territory, law, the economy, politics and so forth came about through a metamorphosis of feudal structures. Modern configurations emerged through century-long processes in which the pre-modern structures were only gradually reduced to, more or less, empty shells, or were completely eradicated. Thus, modern configurational structures can also be understood as parasitoids (parasites which end up killing their hosts), in the sense that the new and increasingly autonomous structures of modern society were dependent on -and, to a large extent, created by -28 supra. the previously existing structures, but nonetheless ended up marginalising these selfsame structures over time.
Although relics of the feudal structures continue to exist in European settings (for example, constitutional monarchies and nobility networks), they no longer occupy a central position in society. However, a variant of the conflictual relationship between pre-modern and modern structures continues to have central importance in large parts of the world today. This is the case because, through imperialism, the specific western form of societal organisation was exported throughout the entire globe. The consequence is that large parts of the world -most notably in Africa, Asia and Latin America -continue to be characterised by multiple layers, in the sense that modern forms of organisation that are essentially of European origin -such as codified legal systems and generalised bureaucratic structures -have been imposed "on top" of (in the Western sense) traditional forms of societal organisation, without achieving a complete marginalisation of traditional forms of societal organisation.
Thus, the different logics that they represent continue to operate simultaneously, either in a separate but entangled manner, or through the formation of hybrid structures which combine elements from the two dimensions. 49 The basic institutional features of modern society, such as constitutions, contract law, property rights and so forth might be in place at the same time as pre-modern forms of differentiation, in different degrees and variations, continue to define the form of social operations "beneath" modern structures, and often in a manner which short-circuits the operative practices of the modern structures. In most places in the world, not only the state, but also the kind of configurational webs described above, remain a fairly new phenomenon, in the sense that the globalisation of such structures first unfolded in the wake of the de-colonialisation processes of the mid-Twentieth century. Thus, the overriding structural reason seems to be a failure of functional systems and (inter-) national configurational webs to adapt internally to increases in the globalisation of the selfsame systems through adequate internal re-configurations. For example, the changes brought about by the relative increase in the centrality of the United States for the economic system from the late Nineteenth century onwards was not reflected in a concordant shift in the institutional set-up. The British Pound remained the global anchor currency long after the basis for that role had disappeared. In a similar manner, the rising importance of the United States was not reflected in an increased role of the US political system within the globalising political system in the inter-war period, thereby creating a discrepancy between the form and the location of economic and political reproduction processes and the institutional architecture which aimed to stabilise these processes. Only after the catastrophe did sufficient learning processes unfold through the establishment of the Bretton-Woods system, the institutionalisation of the US dollar as the global anchor currency, and the internal reconfiguration of the global political system through the handover of the hegemonic credentials from the UK to the US.
The re-stabilising constitutional architecture of the "Westphalian-Keynesian frame", 52 as outlined in the Bretton-Woods architecture, however, only maintained itself for a few decades, just as it essentially remained a structure which had the North Atlantic space as its core. 53 As embodied by the collapse of the Bretton-Woods arrangement, a gradual breakdown of the distinction between the "West and the rest" started in the 1970s, with the increased (re-) inclusion of Japan and, later on, through the increased weight of other parts of the East Asian region in the world economy.
Future historical studies might, therefore, come to the conclusion that the 2008 financial crisis can only be adequately understood when it is seen as a culmination of a far bigger transformational shift which has been unfolding from the 1970s onwards;
a shift which was contemporarily concealed through the kind of super-bubble, compromising a whole range of sub-bubbles within financial markets, private consumption, housing, government spending and so forth, 54 which had characterised large parts of the global economy in the last three decades. crisis reflects a discrepancy between the structural composition of the world economy and the (inter-) national regulatory architecture which aims to stabilise it. In this sense, the current crisis, and also the crisis of the 1930s, can be understood as a form of globalisation crisis. This does not mean that globalisation, as such, is the problem, but it does mean that a striking inability to respond to structural transformations can be observed, in the sense that the increased globalisation of functional systems is not reflected in the corresponding adaptations and reconfigurations of the institutional, and, indeed, constitutional, framing of economic processes, as well as other social processes. Both the Great Depression and the 2008 crisis indicate that an orderly "hand-over" of the role of the anchor of the world economy in the wake of structural transformations seems impossible to achieve.
VI. Crisis through Coalescence
Not surprisingly, the process leading to the 2008 financial crisis has certain structural affinities with the kind of processes which unfolded in the transitional phases which However, in practice, the expansion of the state was a two-way street because the expansion of the public realm through an incorporation of private structures over time undermined the inner constitution of the political system, in the sense that the privatistic logic guiding the incorporated special interests increasingly came to dominate the state. Thus, the central consequence which emerges from the first half of the European catastrophe was coalescence in the sense that the functionally-differentiated infrastructure of modernity as provided by organisational systems was exposed to immense pressure and, in some parts of world society, it completely collapsed, thereby providing the basis for the kind of totalitarian politics which came to dominate in the second half of the European implosion process.
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The "cheap money" regime which the expansion of the global economy, with the US economy as its anchor, has relied upon in the last three decades can be described with a similar vocabulary. The introduction of a new financial regime upon the basis of monetarist ideology represented an unviable compensatory reaction to structural changes, which led to a partial breakdown of the functional separation between the political and the economic system. The relative weakening of the position of the United States as the "engine" and institutional anchor of the world economy over the last four decades created immense pressure for increasing growth levels in order to maintain a dominating position. Although such processes are far too complex to be reduced to the outcome of formalised political decisions, the introduction of "Reaganomics" as a vehicle for winning the Cold War and, more generally, to maintain the standing of the United States in the world, is a case in point. The so-called neo-liberal ideological framework which was developed in order to underpin this development was, in principle, based upon the idea of a retrenchment of the state in order to let the market reign upon the basis of selfcorrecting processes. The consequence was, however, not so much a cut-back of the state, as a re-configuration of the state and the tax regime upon which it relied. The result of the latter was an increase in economic social inequality. But, from a longterm perspective, the re-configuration of the state was far more important in so far as it led to a capture of the raison d'État by privatistic interests, thereby undermining the distinction between political and economic rationality. This was not only the case in relation to the privatisation of natural monopolies (water supply, railways, etc.) which have always operated on the borderline between the private and the public sphere.
Instead, a far more profound capture took place through the introduction of New Public Management instruments throughout the state, thereby subsuming political operations to economic rationality.
In addition, the regulatory function of the political system in the state form vis-à-vis the economic system was broken down through the move towards the deregulation of the financial markets, a move which, however, was not so much about the degree of public control as a move implying capture, in the sense that public regulators influenced by monetarist ideology were transformed from being the guardians of the public interest into being the servants of the financial industry, with the result that the relationship between operators and regulators increasingly became characterised by coalescence. This effectively undermined the value of the structural coupling between the economic and the political system, in the sense that the form of stability and restraint imposed by public regulation vis-à-vis economic processes was increasingly weakened. This had subsequent effects internally in the financial system because the differentiation between different functions, products and levels of risk collapsed, in the sense that the distinction between banks, investment banks and hedge funds became increasingly blurred. Thus, apart from a general re-inforcement of publicly sanctioned regulation, a case can be made for a new form of societal through the submission of society in its entirety to a single form of rationality. Fundamentalist ideologies are ideologies of coalescence. As such, neo-liberalism is, in its logical composition, also to be understood as a fundamentalist ideology, in so far as it seeks to impose a onedimensional economistic logic on society in its entirety. The difference -apart, of course, from the radically different degrees of societal "damage" which different fundamentalist ideologies have actually coursed -is that extreme cases such as Communism, Fascism and National Socialism sought to submit society in its entirety to an immediate form of the political without relying on an external semantic universe as a medium. These totalitarian ideologies share the view that the political system in the totalitarian form should transpose itself into all others spheres of society upon the basis of an unmediated political logic. They advocate a naked form of power in which and heterarchy. 72 The central structural transformation which looms behind these developments can, however, be traced back to the insight contained in Luhmann`s "speculative hypothesis" of the law's future transformation away from a reliance on territorial boundaries and towards an increased reliance on functional differentiation upon the basis of a relative shift away from normative expectations towards cognitive expectations.
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While accepting the basic premises, one might argue that this perspective falls a bit too short in relation to one important aspect. The modern legal system evolved in a close co-evolutionary relationship with the political system and the advocates of transnational or world law (Weltrecht) implicitly or explicitly work on the assumption that this tight co-evolutionary relationship is being weakened through globalisation. Despite the difference in the character of the relations, similar institutional forms oriented towards the structuring of such interaction tend to emerge. But, whereas the functional dimension (Sachdimension) is likely to be central to the first dimension because the actors are operating within the same sphere, the social dimension (Sozialdimension) is likely to be stronger within the second dimension. When the issue in question implies a need to bridge a gap between different spheres of society, the need for negotiation or dialogue schemes, from which common ground can be found, tends to be greater. In addition, it is possible to observe the emergence of overarching regimes which bind together a whole range of public and private elements within a given functionally-delineated field. What is common for regulatory organisations, as well as multinationals, is the fact that they tend to become parts of larger conglomerates, in the sense that a multiplicity of observers, in the form of producers, consumers, regulators and so forth, become part of functionally-delineated configurative processes which tend to produce a convergence of expectations between the actors in question upon the basis of a (more or less well-developed) set of principles, norms and rules, which together constitutes a "higher order".
76 Moreover, such developments imply the development of independent sources of authority. A key example here is the function of "scientific knowledge" within risk regulation (for example, within the Comitology structures of the EU, and the SPS committee of the WTO and private self-regulation bodies). In other cases, the backbone of functional regimes tends to be constituted through the emergence of specialised institutions which develop globally deployed ranking instruments. This is, for instance, the case in relation to capital markets, 77 sports, 78 freedom of the press 79 and higher education. Delving a bit deeper, it is, moreover, possible to observe that transnational structures have adopted a number of concepts which serve as functional equivalents to concepts which provide the constitutive infrastructure of the political in the nationstate form. The concepts of "nation," "the public sphere", "representation" and "delegation" are being substituted by the concepts of "stakeholders", "transparency", "self-representation" and "accountability". The transnational concepts have a far higher cognitive component than their nation-state counterparts, thereby illustrating that not only transnational law but also transnational politics is characterised by a high degree of cognitivisation.
They provide the constitutive basis for functionally-delineated universes with a global reach. In some cases, the rankings are, moreover, supplemented by certification instruments, such as those developed by ISO (product standards) and FLO-CERT (Independent International Certification Agency for Fairtrade Production Processes and Products), which even more proactively seek to transform the way in which actors operates within a given area.
Stakeholders:
The political system in the nation-state form relies on the nation (or "the people"), understood as a generalised and abstract legal construction, in order
(1) to delineate the reach of their power; (2) to act as a form through which power is transposed into other parts of society; (3) and as a form through which social complexity is reduced, in the sense that the concept of the nation is used to delineate the part of the world which a given political sub-system takes account of in its decision-making. The latter form is closely associated with the concept of democracy.
Democracy can be understood as a specific form through which the political system observes its own environment -a form that is characterised by a duality between stability and change, in the sense that the people, through the conception of the
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On the constitutive role of rating agencies in relation to the global financial system, see T.J. Sinclair, "The Problems of Growing up and getting rich: How the truly obscure became very important in global financial market and to us all" (Typescript, on file with author). nation, is defined as a (relatively) stable entity, at the same time as the "nature of the people", in terms of preferences, interests, and norms are dynamic, thereby allowing the political system to increase its level of reflexivity and thereby its ability to adapt when changes occur in its environment. Thus, the specificity of democracy (when compared to other forms of rule such as feudalism and totalitarianism) is that, within the framework of the nation, it remains open to the future, in the sense that what counts as a politically-relevant problem, or how it should be dealt with, is not prescribed.
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The stakeholder concept essentially fulfils a similar role in transnational space. thereby are granted the right to "feed into" decisional processes at the same time as they also serve as the addressees for such decisions. Thus, the stakeholder status serves as a form through which the entity in question delineates the section of its social environment, which it regards as relevant for its operationability. It is the form through which it transmits the meaning components which it produces at the same time as it serves as a frame through which changes in its social environment can be observed, thereby providing a basis for increased adaptability through increased reflexivity. When viewed from a historical perspective, nations have rarely been
In this specific sense, democracy is characterised by a high level of adaptability and this is probably the reason why it has proved to be "evolutionary superior" when measured against the other forms of rule which have existed so far. particularly stable in terms of their extent and composition. However, the stakeholder form is even more "fluid". The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion operate with a far higher speed in relation to stakeholders, and, in this sense the borders of stakeholder regimes, are extremely contingent. This flexibility, on the one hand, makes them more adaptive than the form of the nation, and thereby potentially even more "evolutionary superior" than democratic structures. On the other hand, the price paid for such fluidity is a "loss of depth", in the sense that the kind of impact which can be achieved through this form might be relatively limited.
Transparency: In the nation-state context, the public sphere is widely understood as the form through which the will formation of the polity takes place. 83 However, radical increases in social complexity mean that only a very limited number of potentially relevant issues can be processed within the public sphere. Although the mass media system, which serves as a central component of the public sphere, has undergone profound globalisation in recent decades, the public sphere remains essentially limited to the nation-state form. options for further policy development. They also tend to develop specific norms and become policy actors in their own right. 87 Delegation of competencies always implies a step into the unknown and the uncontrollable. Thus, a "gap" exists between what can be controlled through delegation and the structures which are actually in place. It is this gap which is filled out through the emergence of different forms of accountability measures, for example, through the development of accountability charters which lay down operational standards and norms. This development can also be seen as being closely-related to the development of a "right to justification", in the sense that the observers which are (negatively) affected by a given activity tend to develop claims that the effect must be justified. 88 All of the different dimensions of the transnational form of the political outlined above have been widely discussed and analysed by academics in the last decades.
What seems to be lacking is the development of a general theory capable of linking them systematically together. When observed in isolation, the mutual supportive character of these dimensions is not clear. Only a more general conceptual framework will make it possible to observe empirically to what degree the observed phenomena constitute, or, potentially, will be capable of constituting, "higher orders" beyond national configurations.
In addition, the relationship between the transnational form of the political and transnational forms of law will have to be systematically clarified emerge in relation to these structures. One might argue that such non-hierarchical co-ordination processes are subject to constitutionalisation processes, to the extent that they rely on legally-ramified principles which determine the inclusion of actors as well as well-developed procedures of decision-making.
A third dimension relates to the kind of overarching configurations which emerges when a multiplicity of actors, organisations and the interlocking governance structures are bound together within a principle-based and legally-ramified overall framework. The term constitutionalism, although it has traditionally been understood as referring to a theory of constitutions, might be a useful term to describe such elements. Such configurations are closely-connected to an agenda concerned with the establishment of an overarching order in the transnational space which has only been partially realised to date. Thus, in the transnational context, the term constitutionalism can, at the same time, serve as a regulatory idea and as the basis for the description of the embryonic features of a new order capable of curtailing coalescence under changed structural conditions.
VIII. Conclusion
The 2008 crisis is a reflection of a double movement which took the form of increased globalisation of national configurations and thus dislocations in the relationship between national configurations and a transformation of the structural composition of the transnational layer of world society. Changes occurred, which were not adequately reflected in the accordant adaptations of the stabilising structures which economic and other forms of societal reproduction rely upon, thereby creating the basis for the kind of over-expansion through acceleration, asymmetric relations and coalescence which led to overstretching, de-differentiation and subsequent collapse.
The response therefore needs to rely on two equally important and inter-related dimensions: first an establishment of a new public constitutional order of the world economy (Bretton Woods II), which should adequately reflect the present degree of globalisation of the world economy and the relative weight of national configurations.
The rise of Asia needs to be reflected in the institutional set-up which guides the world economy. This move should also imply the establishment of a global currency unit, whose aim is to avoid the kind of transformation processes with the disastrous effects which tend to unfold every time structural transformations necessitate a shift in the global anchor currency. However, such a new global regulatory architecture will imply more not less transnationality, thereby also actualising the need for additional constitutional measures in order to stabilise and control the transnational dimension of public international structures.
Secondly, the already existing, but highly disperse, forms of private constitutional arrangements in relation to firms, trade associations, self-regulatory frameworks, collegial institutions and so forth would need to strengthened and systematised, thereby increasing the double reflexivity emerging from such processes in order to create a dense net of mutually re-inforcing intra-and intersystemic webs; that is to say, both in relation to the internal stabilisation of the economic system and in relation to the external impact of economic reproduction. In practice, the self-constitution of societal sectors through the increased establishment of internal mechanisms of ordering implies an institutionalisation of a transnational variant of the kind of second order politics within the non-state social structures which characterise national configurations and the legal underpinning of such structures through a hierarchy of norms.
